The Local Authority could not take into account Personal Injury Trusts as a reason for failing to provide care
In this case a local authority ceased providing funds for a seriously injured person, indeed they demanded money back. The local authority contended that money in a personal injury trust should properly be taken into account. Further it was argued that even if the local authority had acted unlawfully the court should exercise its discretion not to grant the claimant any relief. Neither argument was successful.
Published: March 16th, 2026
5 minute read
The Case
CGT, R (On the Application Of) v West Sussex County Council [2026] EWHC 293 (Admin) HHJ Auerbach (Sitting as Judge of the High Court).
Judge’s Quote:
“Mr Paget described the Decision Letter as a public law decision taken to protect the public purse. He relied on the fact that the CICA funding and local authority funding both draw upon public money. But it cannot be right that the court should proceed on the basis that different public bodies, with different sources of public funding, governed by different funding regimes, should be treated as if they were one. Further, to take such an approach would be to ride roughshod over the principled distinction between the position of the tortfeasor (be they a public or private body – the authorities draw no distinction) and that of a local authority which is subject to statutory duties. It is simply not the function of the local authority when carrying out those duties to concern itself with such questions. The statute and the Regulations tell it how to perform the relevant calculations.”
Key Practice Points
In one sense this is a case of narrow interest to those involved in advising seriously injured claimants who set up personal injury trusts. Such trusts have statutory protection. In a wider sense it shows the difficulties of arguing that a court should not exercise its discretion in favour of a claimant when a defendant has been found to have acted unlawfully and contrary to statute. It is not for the local authority, or the court, to “ride roughshod” over statutory duties.
The Facts
The claimant suffers severe lifelong disabilities following a brain injury in infancy. He received a CICA award exceeding £3.5m, including c.£2.6m for future care, paid into a personal injury trust (PI Trust). In 2012, the claimant’s late mother (then deputy) and the Official Solicitor gave undertakings to CICA restricting applications for public funding (the “2012 CICA undertakings”). The mother died in 2013; the father was appointed deputy in 2014 without any such restriction and gave no undertakings. From July 2020 the defendant local authority funded care on a discretionary, without-prejudice basis. In October 2023 the defendant unsuccessfully sought to vary the deputyship in the Court of Protection to impose restrictions mirroring the 2012 undertakings. By the Decision Letter of 7 June 2024 the defendant ceased funding and demanded repayment (£271,253.44), relying on alleged “double recovery” and the 2012 undertakings.
The Judicial Review Proceedings
The claimant applied for judicial review of the local authority decision, arguing that the decision to take into account the personal injury trust was unlawful because of a statutory prohibition. The local authority denied this. In the alternative the local authority argued that the principle of avoiding double recovery meant the court should exercise its discretion not to grant the claimant any relief.
What happened in a nutshell
The local authority’s arguments were rejected and the claimant granted relief. The statutory principles were clear that a personal injury trust must be disregarded. The earlier 2012 undertakings were personal, non-binding and legally ineffective. Reliance on them was unlawful. The court rejected the argument that relief should be refused to avoid double recovery. Double recovery principles apply to the assessment of tort damages, not to the discharge of statutory Care Act duties.
Forbes comment
In strict legal terms the correct decision (although of course discretion could have been exercised). It does however appear to grant the claimant a windfall in that the claimant was awarded a significant sum for “future care” by the CICA so there is undoubtedly double recovery. Had the same restrictions and an undertaking been requested/ imposed (presumably these were not requested by the authority) when the deputyship changed in 2014, the issue would not have arisen.
Full judgment available on request.
For further information please contact John Myles
